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DENIAL OF ATOMIC VETERANS' TORT CLAIMS: THE
ENDURING FALLOUT FROM FERES v. UNITED STATES
Between 1945 and 1962, the United States government, as part
of its atomic bomb testing program, detonated approximately 181
nuclear devices at test sites in the southwestern United States and
the Pacific Ocean.1 These nuclear tests exposed approximately
400,000 military and Atomic Energy Commission personnel en-
gaged in concurrent troop maneuvers to varying levels of atomic
radiation.2 Several veterans and their families have filed suit
against the United States for wrongful exposure to nuclear radia-
'tion, alleging that they have a higher than average risk of disease
and genetic damage.'
The statute under which veterans usually obtain compensation
for service-related injuries, the Veteran's Benefits Act 4 (V.B.A.),
provides little relief for these atomic veterans. The V.B.A. estab-
lishes a presumption that any disease manifesting itself within one
year of a serviceman's discharge is service-related, and thus com-
pensable-under the Act.5 Radiation-induced injuries, however, de-
velop slowly; disease or cellular damage from radiation usually has
a latency period of more than one year.' Consequently, atomic vet-
erans can expect little success obtaining compensation under the
V.B.A. Indeed, since 1967 the Veterans Administration has re-
jected ninety-two percent of the claims filed for radiation injuries
arising from nuclear testing.7 Additionally, the V.B.A. covers inju-
1. Grim Legacy of Nuclear Testing, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1979 § 6 (Magazine), at 70.
2. Id.
3. One of the first veterans to bring suit for in-service irradiation, Orville Kelly, partici-
pated in 22 atomic bomb tests. In 1979, Mr. Kelly, with his wife Wanda, founded the Na-
tional Association of Atomic Veterans in Burlington, Iowa. See generally Berrelry, A Nu-
clear Time Bomb, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Other organizations concerned with
the plight of "atomic veterans" include the National Veterans Law Center and the Veterans
Education Project, both based in Washington, D.C.
4. 38 U.S.C. §§ 320-1008 (1976 & Supp. IH 1979).
5. 38 U.S.C. § 312(a)(1) (1976).
6. Favish, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on
Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 960 (1981).
7. Grim Legacy of Nuclear Testing, supra note 1, at 70. Atomic %eterans may be more
successful in recovering from the Veterans Administration after Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-
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ries only to servicemen, while many of the radiation-induced inju-
ries involve birth defects and other genetic injuries suffered by ser-
vicemen's children. The V.B.A., then, provides no compensation
for radiation injuries to a veteran's family 8
Frustrated by their inability to recover under the V.B.A., atomic
veterans have turned to the Federal Tort Claims Act9 (F T.C.A.)
for relief. Although the F T.C.A. functions as a waiver of tradi-
tional sovereign immunity in many contexts, the United States Su-
preme Court, in Feres v. United States,0 carved out an exception
from the F T.C.A. for servicemen and veterans. In Feres, the Court
held that the government is not liable under the F T.C.A. for inju-
ries to servicemen if the injuries occur incident to military ser-
vice. 1 This judicially created exception to the F.T.C.A. known as
the Feres doctrine protects the government from liability for ser-
vice-related injuries to soldiers and veterans.
This Note will survey and evaluate the suits brought by atomic
veterans, with particular emphasis on the F T.C.A., the Feres doc-
trine, and the various legal theories employed by veterans attempt-
ing to circumvent the Feres doctrine. This Note will conclude that
in virtually all cases, the Feres doctrine effectively precludes an
atomic veteran or his family from recovering under the F.T.C.A.
for rn-service radiation injuries. Compensation for the victims of
nuclear radiation exposure must come, therefore, not from the
courts, but from congressional action.
0906 (D.D.C. Sept. 30 1981). In Gott, the court invalidated the rules used by the Veterans
Administration and the Defense Nuclear Agency for evaluating claims by atomic veterans
because the rules violated the notice and comment requirements for rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The court ordered the Veterans Administration and the De-
fense Nuclear Agency to promulgate new rules in accordance with required procedures.
8. The V.B.A. provides that the "United States will pay to any veteran compensation
as provided in this subchapter [f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or
disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval or air service, during a period
of war." 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1976) (emphasis added). The same basic entitlement is granted to
veterans who are injured or contract a disease "during other than a period of war." 38
U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1976).
10. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
11. Id. at 146. "Incident to service" is a term used by the courts to describe activity re-
lated to or arising from one's service in the military. The term is not statutorily defined.
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THE F T.C.A. AND THE Feres DOCTRINE
The F T.C.A. and the Serviceman
Congress enacted the F T.C.A. to establish a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity by extending a judicial remedy to those who
previously had none.12 Prior to the enactment of the F.T.C.A., a
citizen could recover for injuries caused by government agents only
by filing a special bill in Congress.' s By limiting sovereign immu-
nity statutorily, Congress sought to avoid the time-consuming,
inefficient, and often inequitable process of reviewing these private
bills for relief. 14
The F T.C.A. excludes thirteen types of claims from its broad
waiver of sovereign immunity,15 insulating the federal government
from liability to military personnel when they are injured during
combat 6 or while m a foreign country 17 Despite clear indications
from the text'8 and the drafters 9 of the F.T.C.A. that the Act was
12. Comment, The Supreme Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of An Enlightened
Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 267, 271 (1978). Congress intended to mitigate sovereign immu-
nity's often harsh and unjust consequences. Id.
13. Note, The Effect of the Feres Doctrine on Tort Actions Against the United States
by Family Members of Servicemen, 50 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 1241, 1242 (1982).
14. Comment, supra note 12, at 271.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1976).
16. Id. § 2680(j).
17. Id. § 2680(k). See Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Service-
men, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 532 (1980). See also infra notes 24-26 regarding the "combatant
activities" and "foreign country" exceptions to the F.T.C.A.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (1976). See also infra notes 24-26.
19. In United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd 337 U.S. 49 (1949), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that all members of the armed
forces were, by implication, excluded from the coverage of the F.T.C.A. Representative Em-
manuel Cellars, a central figure in the passage of the Act, challenged the reasoning of the
court in a statement delivered orally to the Yale Law Review on November 26, 1948:
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit is utterly erroneous when it says that it was
the intent of Congress to exclude a member of the Armed Forces from the
benefits of the Tort Claims Act. I had more to do with [the Act] than any
other member. I never intended to preclude a suit by a soldier. Despite the fact
that the latter might have various and sundry remedies for compensation, pen-
sions, hospitalization preferences, etc., these benefits had nothing whatsoever
to do with, and are utterly unrelated to the right to sue under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. [The Government deliberately removes the defense of sover-
eignty except in cases where the Act specifically makes an exception. The ex-
ception cannot be implied; it must be expressed. The court cannot read the
exception into the law.
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not meant to prohibit tort claims by servicemen, courts have been
reluctant to recognize such claims under the Act. One commenta-
tor suggested that the judicial reluctance to read the F T.C.A. as
including tort suits by servicemen stems not from an attempt to
adhere to legislative intent, but rather from important economic
and political considerations.20 The danger inherent in effective mil-
itary training and the large number of personnel in the military
make the consequences of potentially large awards to servicemen a
legitimate economic concern. Moreover, courts may realize that
taxpayers would bear the burden of paying damage awards, per-
haps an undesirable consequence in light of recent voter animosity
toward continually rising tax rates.2" Whether for political or eco-
nomic reasons, courts adhere to the Feres doctrine and imply an
exception in the F.T.C.A. for servicemen and veterans.
Formulation of the Feres Doctrine: Justification and Limitations
In Brooks v. United States,22 decided one year before Feres, the
United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for the Feres
doctrine. The Court in Brooks allowed a serviceman injured in an
off-base auto accident while on furlough to recover damages under
the F.T.C.A. After examining the legislative history of the
F T.C.A.,25 the Court noted that both the "overseas injuries '24 and
Statement from Representative Cellars to Yale Law Review (Nov. 26, 1948), quoted in Note,
Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 58 YALE L.J. 615, 621 n.26 (1949). For
a discussion of the Supreme Court's disposition of Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949), see infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
20. Comment, supra note 12, at 270. Indeed, one justification for sovereign immunity "is
that to allow recovery against the government would threaten a raid on the federal treasury,
endanger important policies and goals, and ultimately affect the stability of the govern-
ment." Id.
Addressing the court's failure in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (Jaf-
fee 1) to delineate the constitutional rights of an atomic veteran, a second commentator
argued that politics and economics, not statutory interpretation, prevent constitutional suits
by servicemen: "While the posture of the judiciary cannot be fully justified with respect to
this position [the failure to expand the protection of constitutional rights to atomic veterans
cases], it can perhaps be explained with reference to unmentioned political and economic
interests at stake in the controversy." Comment, Sovereign Immunity - Armed Forces -
Nuclear Liability - Jaffee v. United States, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 377, 393 (1979).
21. Comment, Sovereign Immunity - Armed Forces - Nuclear Liability - Jaffee v. United
States, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv. 377, 393, n.123 (1979).
22. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
23. Id. at 51-52.
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"combatant activities"2 5 exceptions to that Act evidenced congres-
sional concern with the effect of sovereign immunity on soldiers
and veterans.26
Although statutory disability payments would be taken into ac-
count in awarding tort damages,27 the Court held in Brooks that
Congress did not mandate an election of remedies by injured ser-
vicemen simply because other statutes provided disability pay-
ments to veterans. 28 Thus, recovery under veteran's compensation
statutes and the F T.C.A. was permissible. In dicta foreshadowing
Feres, however, the Court suggested that an F T.C.A. recovery was
not available to a soldier or his survivors in cases involving injuries
or death occurring "incident to service.
'29
The "incident to service" dicta of Brooks became the dispositive
criterion for servicemen's eligibility under the F T.C.A. in Feres v.
United Statess0 and its companion cases, Griggs v. United States81
and Jefferson v. Unted States.3 2 Unlike Brooks, each of these
cases involved a claim brought under the F T.C.A. for the death of
or injury to a serviceman occurring while the serviceman was on
duty. The plaintiffs in Jefferson and Griggs alleged negligent treat-
ment of servicemen by military doctors, while Feres was a survival
action brought by the wife of a soldier killed m a barracks fire.
After distinguishing Brooks because that case did not involve a
service-related death or injury,3 3 the Court enunciated the only ju-
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1976) states that the "provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title [relating to the government as a defendant in tort suits], shall not apply
to - (j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war."
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976) exempts the government from liability under § 1346(b) for
"any claim arising in a foreign country."
26. "It would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the servicemen in mind in
1946, when this statute [the F.T.C.A.] was passed. The overseas and combatant exceptions
make tbis plain." 337 U.S. at 51.
27. Id. at 53-54.
28. Id. at 53. The Court found "nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws
which provides for exclusiveness of remedy." Id.
29. Id. at 52.
30. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
31. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950).
32. 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950).
33. 340 U.S. at 146.
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dicially created exception to the F T.C.A., the Feres doctrine:
"[T]he Government is not liable under the F T.C.A. for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.34
The Court justified creating an exception to the F T.C.A. be-
cause tort claims by servicemen have two unique characteristics.
First, the relationship between the government and its armed
forces is "distinctively federal in character"35 and has no analogous
private counterpart. The F T.C.A. subjects the United States to li-
ability for torts only "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances. 3 6 In Feres, the
Court held that because no private relationship exists paralleling
the distinctively federal soldier-government relationship, the gov-
ernment is not liable under the F T.C.A. for in-service torts against
servicemen.
The second justification in Feres for prohibiting F T.C.A. claims
for rn-service torts was the existence of a military compensation
scheme. Ignoring its own statement in Brooks that Congress, by
enacting the F.T.C.A., had not mandated an election of remedies
by servicemen,3 7 the Court held that the existence of a military
compensation scheme precluded recovery under the Act. 8 Because
Congress had not provided for an adjustment of damages reflecting
recovery under an existing military benefits scheme, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had not contemplated tort recovery by ser-
vicemen in formulating the F T.C.A.3 9
Four years later in United States v. Brown,4° the Court ex-
plained and limited the Feres doctrine. In Brown, the plaintiff
sought an F.T.C.A. recovery for the negligence of military doctors
in performing a routine knee operation. Although the original in-
jury to the knee occurred while the plaintiff was on active duty,
the surgery itself occurred after the plaintiff's honorable dis-
34. Id.
35. 340 U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
37. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). See also supra notes 22-29 and ac-
companying text.
38. 340 U.S. at 144.
39. Id.
40. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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charge.41 Notwithstanding its application of the Feres doctrine in
Gnggs42 and Jefferson,43 the Court allowed recovery in Brown be-
cause the military doctors were negligent in aggravating the plain-
tiffs injuries; the negligence was not incident to the plaintiff's mili-
tary service."
In Brown, the Court imposed an important limitation on the
Feres doctrine. If a serviceman proves that the tort occurred either
after his discharge or apart from his military service, he may pro-
ceed with his F T.C.A. claim. Additionally, Brown indicated that
the "incident to service" criteria of Feres was not a strictly causal
test. But for his military service, the plaintiff in Brown would not
have been tortiously injured; nevertheless, he still recovered
F T.C.A. damages. 45
Although Brown provided a possible means of circumventing the
Feres doctrine, Brown also established a third rationale for the ex-
istence of the doctrine. Reiterating the factors that had been dis-
positive in Feres - the distinctively federal relationship between
-servicemen and government, and the existence of a military com-
pensation scheme - the Court recognized the difficulty, if not im-
possibility, of maintaining military discipline if servicemen could
sue their decision-making superiors.4 e The military discipline ratio-
nale has survived extensive criticism and remains a strong justifi-
41. Id.
42. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. 348 U.S. at 113.
45. The dissent in Brown read the "incident to service" test of Feres as mandating a
strict causation test. The plaintiff's injuries, the dissent noted, were
inseparably related to military service. But for this army service this vet-
eran could not have been injured in the veterans hospital as he was eligible and
admitted for treatment there solely because of war service which gave him vet-
eran status. Moreover, he was actually being treated for an army service injury.
Id. at 114. (Black, J., dissenting).
Subsequent cases involving the Feres doctrine followed the strict causation test suggested
by the dissent in Brown. In In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F Supp.
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), the children of
Vietnam veterans exposed to the herbicide Agent Orange were barred from recovering for
alleged genetic and somatic injuries because the "injuries alleged by the children had their
genesis in the exposure of their parents" and "arose out of and were incident to the service
of the parent." 506 F Supp. at 781. The "genesis incident to service" test is discussed fur-
ther infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
46. 348 U.S. at 112.
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cation for the bar against servicemen's F T.C.A. suits. 47
The Vitality of the Feres Doctrine: Supreme Court Decisions Af-
ter Feres
Although the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the Feres
doctrine, ambiguities and inconsistencies in recent decisions make
the doctrine's rationale difficult to ascertain. 8 In Dalehite v.
United States49 the Court reversed an F T.C.A. award to plaintiffs
who alleged government negligence in the storage and packaging of
fertilizer which caused a disasterous shipboard fire. Although the
principal reason for reversing the lower court award was the statu-
tory "discretionary function" exception to the F T.C.A.,5 ° the
Court, quoting Feres, also denied recovery because the liability
that plaintiff sought to impose on the government had no analo-
gous private counterpart.51 According to the Court, the effect of
the F T.C.A. "is to waive immunity from recognized causes of ac-
tion and. . . not to visit the Government with novel and unprece-
dented liability. '52
Within five years of Dalehite, however, the Court twice re-
nounced the analogous private liability rationale of Feres and
Dalehite. In Indian Towing v. United States5" the F T.C.A. plain-
tiff alleged that negligent operation of a lighthouse by the Coast
Guard caused plaintiff's barge to run aground. 4 While acknowl-
edging that operation of a lighthouse is "uniquely governmental,"
47. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text for discussion and criticism of Feres.
48. As recently as 1977, the Court reaffirmed the Feres doctrine in Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), discussed infra notes 61-74 and accompany-
ing text.
A9. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
50. Id. at 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 states that "[tihe provisions of this chapter and section'
1346(b) of this title [relating to the United States as a defendant in tort claims suits] shall
not apply to - Any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty." The "discretionary function" excep-
tion provides the government with wide-ranging immunity from normal F.T.C.A. liability.
See generally Clark, Discretionary Functions and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays into
Sanctuaries from Tort Liability, 16 A.F.L. REv. 33 (1974).
51. 346 U.S. at 43.
52. Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950)).
53. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
54. Id. at 62.
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as is all governmental activity covered by the F T.C.A.,55 the Court
nevertheless held the Coast Guard responsible for the incident.
The Court refused to predicate F T.C.A. liability on "such a com-
pletely fortuitous circumstance" as "the presence or absence of
identical private liability. 56
The Court specifically expressed in Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States57 the unarticulated conclusion of Indian Towing - that the
analogous private liability rationale of Feres was no longer a con-
sideration in F T.C.A. cases. Rayonter involved an F T.C.A. claim
to recover from the United States Forest Service for negligent fail-
ure to extinguish a fire that started on government land and
spread to plaintiff's property 51 Noting that state law would not
impose liability on local governments for their agents' negligent
performance of uniquely governmental activities such as fire fight-
ing, the government argued that the F.T.C.A. imposed liability on
the United States only under circumstances in which governmental
bodies traditionally have been responsible for their agents' negli-
gence. 9 The Court rejected this argument and, in language ex-
pressly contradicting that in Feres, held that "the very purpose of
the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-
encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel
and unprecedented government liability "60
Although the Rayonier and Indian Towing rejection of the anal-
ogous private liability requirement suggested abandonment of the
"distinctively federal" relationship rationale of Feres, the most re-
cent Supreme Court case addressing the Feres doctrine, Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,61 provides a perplexing
reaffirmation of that rationale. The plaintiff in Stencel, a National
Guardsman injured when the cockpit ejection system of his aircraft
malfunctioned, brought a personal injury suit against the United
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id.
57. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
58. Id. at 318-19.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 319.
61. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). See generally Note, From Feres to StenceL Should Military Per-
sonnel Have Access to F.T.C.A. Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1979).
1983] 267
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States and Stencel, the manufacturer of the system.2 Stencel
cross-claimed against the United States seeking indemnity for any
sums that the manufacturer might be required to pay the service-
man.6 3 Because plaintiff incurred the injuries incident to service,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri dismissed his claim against the government; the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the F T.C.A. required the United States to indemnify a third party
who paid damages to an injured serviceman.65 In holding that the
Feres doctrine precluded even third party indemnity, the Court
noted that such an action implicated the "distinctively federal" re-
lationship between the government and its suppliers of ordnance.6 6
Uniform governmental liability among jurisdictions is an under-
lying consideration in both the Feres and Stencel decisions. Feres
purportedly protected the soldier-government relationship by re-
fusing to create "a new cause of action dependent on local law for
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence. '6 7 Similarly,
Stencel protected the "distinctively federal" government-supplier
relationship by refusing to permit the situs of the alleged negli-
gence to affect the government's liability to its suppliers and sub-
contractors.6 8 Despite Indian Towing and Rayonter, which rejected
the "distinctively federal" relationship rationale as a justification
for denying F T.C.A. claims, Stencel indicates that this rationale
remains viable if the suit involves negligence incident to service.
In addition to reviving the "distinctively federal" rationale, the
Court in Stencel reaffirmed the two remaining justifications for the
Feres doctrine. First, a military compensation scheme, the V.B.A.,
offers a swift and efficient remedy for injuries to servicemen. The
Court asserted that the V.B.A. "clothes the Government in the
62. 431 U.S. at 666.
63. Id. at 668.
64. Donham v. United States, 395 F Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afj'd, 536 F.2d 765 (8th
Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977).
65. 431 U.S. at 670.
66. Id. at 672.
67. 340 U.S. at 146.
68. 431 U.S. at 673 (quoting Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 412 U.S. 106, 115
(1974)).
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protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provision""9 to
place a ceiling on the government's liability for intra-military
torts.7 0 Thus, although the injured serviceman received the V.B.A.
benefits, Stencel could not obtain indemnity for damages which it
might be required to pay to the serviceman.7 1 As in Feres, the exis-
tence of a military compensation statute insulated the United
States from liability for negligent injuries incident to military
service.
Finally, in Stencel the Court reemphasized the effect of F.T.C.A.
suits for in-service torts on military discipline. Concerned that
such actions would result in second-guessing military orders,7 2 and
wary of the disruptive effects of requiring one member of the
armed forces to testify regarding the decisions and actions of an-
other, the Court concluded that the military discipline factor
weighed against permitting even third parties to recover damages
from the United States.7 3 "The effect of the action upon military
discipline is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier
directly or by a third party ,,74 Thus, in its most recent considera-
tion of the Feres doctrine, the Court indicated that protecting mil-
itary discipline is a major consideration justifying a ban on
F T.C.A. claims by servicemen.
The Feres Doctrine as Applied in the Lower Courts
Despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the "distinctively
federal" relationship rationale, lower courts, perhaps because of
the confusion caused by Rayonier and Indian Towing, focus on the
military discipline and alternate compensation scheme justifica-
tions in applying the Feres doctrine. In fact, the history of the
Feres doctrine in the circuits is replete with judicial overemphasis
of the military discipline justification, the one rationale not dis-
cussed in Feres.5
Interpretation of the "incident to service" test has been the most
69. 431 U.S. at 675.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 672.
72. Id. at 673.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See infra note 79.
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ill-defined and confusing aspect of the lower courts' application of
the Feres doctrine.76 Feres bans F T.C.A. suits by servicemen only
when injuries "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident
to service."" Neither Feres nor subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions provided the criteria for determining when a soldier's activity
is incident to service; consequently, lower courts have developed
several tests for making this determination.
One "incident to service" test adopts the "effect on military dis-
cipline" rationale. Under this test, the Feres doctrine applies if the
serviceman, when injured, was "performing duties of such a char-
acter as to undermine traditional concepts of military discipline if
he were permitted to maintain a civil suit for injuries resulting
therefrom. 78 Although equating "incident to service" with "sub-
ject to military discipline" advances the policy of protecting mili-
tary discipline, several courts have stretched this criteria to pre-
clude suits in which the effect of an F T.C.A. suit on military
discipline is speculative at best.7 9 The large number of military
medical malpractice suits which have been barred by Feres illus-
trates this point.8"
A second "incident to service" test focuses on the situs of the
injury A court may consider that an injury occurring within the
confines of a military base was incurred incident to service. Al-
though the fact that an injury occurred on a military base is strong
evidence that the plaintiff was engaged in activity incident to ser-
vice at that time,81 the simplicity of the situs test can lead to harsh
76. See generally Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of
Incident to Service, 56 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 485 (1982).
77. 340 U.S. at 146.
78. Downes v. United States, 249 F Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.N.C. 1965). Accord Bankston v.
United States, 480 F.2d 495, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1973).
79. The plaintiff in Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975), failed to recover
under the F.T.C.A. for injuries received while riding a horse rented from a Marine Corps
stable. Similarly, in Keisel v. Buckeye Donkey Ball, Inc., 311 F Supp. 370 (E.D. Va. 1970),
the application of Feres precluded a serviceman from recovering for an injury sustained
while participating in a donkey softball game.
80. See, e.g., Misko v. United States, 453 F Supp. 513, 516 (D.D.C. 1978) (considerations
of military discipline apply equally to medical malpractice cases); Wismewski v. United
States, 416 F Supp. 599, 601 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (government doctor not liable for failing to
notify soldier of results of physical examination); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774,
778 (3d Cir. 1971) (government doctor not liable for issuing inaccurate health certificate).
81. Stanley v. C.I.A., 639 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
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results. In Chambers v. United States,s2 for example, survivors of a
serviceman who drowned in a base swimming pool were denied re-
covery because the court concluded that an accident occurring in
an on-base recreational facility was incident to service even though
the serviceman was not engaged in military activity at the time.83
Another "incident to service" test stresses the serviceman's sta-
tus at the time of injury 8 4 Focusing on the precise relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the military at the time injury occurred
promotes the Feres policy of protecting the "distinctively federal"
relationship between the government and members of its armed
forces.8 5 Thus, the applicability of the Feres doctrine may depend
on whether the injury occurred while the serviceman was on or off
duty, on leave or furlough, or active or discharged.
The vague parameters of the various "incident to service" tests
have allowed expansion of the Feres doctrine to deny claims hav-
ing little or no relation to the policy considerations of insuring a
well-disciplined fighting force, protecting the unique soldier-gov-
ernment relationship, and upholding military compensation
schemes as the exclusive remedy for soldiers and veterans. The du-
rability of the Feres doctrine, however, is unquestionable. Conse-
quently, to litigate successfully an F T.C.A. claim, a serviceman
must establish a tort unrelated to military service, or otherwise cir-
cumvent the Feres doctrine.
RADIATION CASES AND CIRCUMVENTION OF THE Feres DOCTRINE
The Application of Feres to Radiation Exposure Cases
Despite the extremely large number of servicemen involved in
nuclear weapons tests and the government's disregard for their
safety, 8 courts have refused to recognize that claims of atomic vet-
erans warrant special consideration. Because the nuclear tests were
part of military maneuvers to demonstrate the effectiveness of
82. 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966).
83. Id. at 226-27.
84. See, e.g., Thornwell v. United States, 471 F Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
85. Id. at 350.
86. The inadequacy of precautions taken by the United States government in conducting
troop movements m conjunction with nuclear test firings is discussed m Favish, supra note
6.
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ground forces shortly after a nuclear explosion, 7 any resulting in-
juries clearly were incident to service. Feres, then applies to radia-
tion exposure cases. Indeed, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, focusing on the military discipline
rationale of Feres, found Feres to be dispositive because, short of
combat, conducting military maneuvers in the field implicates the
military's special discipline requirement in its purest form.8 8 Con-
sistent with that court's analysis, no court has allowed an atomic
veteran to recover under the F T.C.A. for negligent inservice expo-
sure to radiation from a nuclear explosion. Thus, veterans have re-
sorted to a variety of novel legal theories and to what has been
characterized as "artful pleading" 89 to circumvent the Feres
doctrine.
The Intentwnal Tort Theory
One tactic used by atomic veterans attempting to avoid the
harsh impact of Feres is to allege that the government willfully,
knowingly, or intentionally disregarded the veterans' safety, and
that the Feres doctrine is limited strictly to barring negligence ac-
tions. Even though the Supreme Court has not addressed the ques-
tion of whether Feres applies to intentional torts, every court con-
sidering that proposition has rejected it. 90 Atomic veteran
plaintiffs, however, continue to plead the intentional tort exception
to the Feres doctrine notwithstanding its universal rejection by the
judiciary In Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee II), °1 a former soldier
87. "The military believed that actual nuclear explosions were necessary to accomplish its
goal for troop indoctrination and training and the enhancement of public relations." Id. at
934.
88. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F Supp. 318, 321 (S.D. Ohio 1980). The court
in Everett refused to characterize plaintiff's exposure to radiation during troop maneuvers
as not incident to service despite the plaintiff's allegations that the maneuvers were in es-
sence "human experimentation." Id. at 320.
89. Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 128 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. Jaffee v. United States, 468 F Supp. 632, 634 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd 663 F.2d 1226 (3d
Cir. 1981).
91. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981). Stanley Jaffee, a veteran of a 1953 nuclear detonation in
Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, brought suit for his radiation-induced cancer in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Counts One, Two, and Three of Jaffee's
complaint joined the United States and individual government officials as defendants.
Count Four was a class action seeking an injunction requiring the government to warn vet-
erans of medical risks from radiation and to provide subsidization of medical care for all
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failed to recover for in-service exposure to radiation allegedly re-
sulting in breast cancer, even though he claimed that government
agencies "intentionally and with full knowledge of the conse-
quences of their actions, compelled thousands of soldiers to march
into a nuclear explosion." 2 The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey concluded that the military discipline
rationale applies equally to negligent and intentional torts.9 3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed.9 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit simi-
larly rejected the intentional tort theory in the atomic veteran con-
text in Broudy v. United States."' Suing under the F T.C.A., the
plaintiff in Broudy hoped to avoid Feres by characterizing the gov-
ernment's nuclear testing activities as "unconsented-to-experimen-
tatons."9 The court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, finding that "the Feres doc-
trme does not distinguish between claims based on the alleged
level of culpability of the tortfeasor, whether a negligent, a reckless
or even an intentional tort is alleged. '9 7
Other radiation" and non-radiation 9 cases support the denial of
the intentional tort claim illustrated by Jaffee II and Broudy The
class members. The district court dismissed Count Four and certified it for immediate ap-
peal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to
the request for medical care, but reversed the district court's order as to the requested
warning, thus requiring the government to issue warnings. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d
712 (3d Cir. 1979) (Jaffee 1).
In Jaffee v. United States, 468 F Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979) (Jaffee II) the district court
dismissed Counts One, Two, and Three of Jaffee's original complaint, holding that the Feres
doctrine shielded the individual defendants from liability. A panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit originally reversed the district court, but, sitting en banc, the court
eventually affirmed the dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Three m Jaffee v. United States,
663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (Jaffee III). In the interest of clarity, these three cases will be
referred to throughout this Note as Jaffee I, Jaffee II, and Jaffee III.
92. Jaffee I, 468 F Supp. 632, 633 (D.N.J. 1979).
93. Id. at 634-35.
94. Jaffee III, 663 F.2d at 1239.
95. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 127 n.4.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (Feres bars
suit for radiation-related injuries).
99. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1981); Schnurman v. United
States, 490 F Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
intentional tort theory has been ineffective in mitigating the Feres
ban because litigating intentional torts would disrupt military dis-
cipline and undermine military decision-making no less than suits
for negligence. 100 Failure of the intentional tort theory to provide a
limitation on Feres inspired veterans to pursue alternative theories
for recovery
Suits Brought Directly Against Individual Military Personnel or
Civilian Employees
By bringing the suit under the F T.C.A., the plaintiff in Feres
attempted to place liability on the United States government. A
second tactic to circumvent Feres, therefore, is to bring suit di-
rectly against an individual member of the armed forces, such as
an officer or military physician, or against a civilian employee in-
volved in the military operation. This tactic, like the intentional
tort theory, has been uniformly unsuccessful.
In Jaffee II, the plaintiffs filed claims against the United States
and against military officers and civilian employees. 1'0 The district
court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants, re-
jecting plaintiff's contention that Feres applied only to F T.C.A.
claims brought directly against the United States.10 2 Conceding
that Feres involved construction of the F T.C.A., the court pointed
out that Feres did not turn on the language of the Act itself;
rather, Feres turned on the special considerations of military disci-
pline and the unique relationship of a soldier to his superiors. A
suit against individual decision-makers implicates these considera-
100. Jaffee III, 663 F.2d 1235. The contention of the court in Jaffee III that the litigation
of intentional torts will have the same effect on military discipline and decision-making as
the litigation of negligent torts is questionable. By holding a military planner or field officer
liable for his negligence, a court may disrupt discipline and decision-making. Aware that
their colleagues have been liable for their ignorance or carelessness, officers are likely to
refrain from exercising their discretion. Constantly in doubt about the propriety of his ac-
tions, the overly cautious and hesitant officer deprives the military of the benefit of his
sound judgment and professional expertise. Suits for intentional torts by military officers,
however, do not necessarily cause reluctance to exercise command powers. Holding an officer
liable for an intentional tort will not inhibit his colleagues; the specific type of behavior to
be avoided will be apparent to an officer because intentional torts imply an awareness that
an act is in some sense wrong.
101. 468 F Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979).
102. Id. at 634.
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tions as much as does a suit directly against the government. 0 3
Affirming the dismissal of the claims against the individual of-
ficers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Jaffee 111,104 reinforced the policy justification suggested by the
district court. "Suits against individuals have a far greater poten-
tial for chilling responsible decision-making than those against the
government," because "[i]n suits against individuals, the person
who makes the decision is held accountable in damages."' 0 5
The danger of inhibiting military decision-making does not turn
on the military or non-military status of the defendant. The court
of appeals in Jaffee III rejected the appellant's contention that ci-
vilian defendants not party to the relationship between a govern-
ment and its servicemen should not benefit from Feres princi-
ples. 06 Military decisions made by civilian officials implicate many
of the same policy considerations as do those of their subordinate
commanders, because in either case a civilian court would examine
the propriety of military orders. 07
Other courts have agreed with Jaffee III. In Fountain v. United
States,08 the United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas acknowledged that although Feres specifically ad-
dressed sovereign immunity, its reasoning applied to bar actions
against the individual military officers and government officials for
injuries occurring incident to service. 109 The dismissal in Jaffee II
and Fountain of claims against the military and civilian officials
responsible for planning and executing the relevant nuclear deto-
nations is consistent with similar results in non-radiation cases." 0
The principle underlying the strict application of Feres to suits
against individuals is that "an undisciplined army is a mob and he
who is in it would weaken discipline if he can civilly litigate with
103. Id.
104. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 1234.
106. Id. at 1238.
107. Id.
108. 533 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Ark. 1981).
109. Id. at 703.
110. See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Tirill v. McNamara,
451 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971); Bailey v. De Quevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 923 (1967); Misko v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978).
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others in the army""' or civilians making military decisions. 112
Frustrated by the military discipline rationale in suits directly
against the responsible military or civilian officials,113 atomic veter-
ans continue to seek recovery outside the F T.C.A. context.
Suits Alleging Violations of Constitutional Rights
Because Feres and its companion cases"1 4 involved allegations of
common law negligence, many servicemen attempted to avoid the
Feres doctrine by pleading intentional deprivation of their consti-
tutional rights. Like the cases previously discussed in this Note,
suits based on constitutional torts fall into two distinct categories
- those proceeding against the government, and those naming in-
dividual government employees as defendants. Regardless of the
choice of defendant, however, servicemen have failed to recover in
suits alleging constitutional torts.1" 5
Non-radiation suits best illustrate the failure of the constitu-
tional tort theory in suits against the United States. In Schnurman
v. United States,"6 the plaintiff sought damages under the
111. Bailey v. De Quevedo, 375 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
112. Id.
113. The wisdom of bringing suit directly against individual military or civilian officials is
questionable because of the limited financial resources of individual defendants and the
large number of potential claimants. These suits reflect the frustration experienced by
atomic veterans in finding any source of compensation for their radiation-induced injuries.
114. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949),
rev'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
115. The exact nature of the constitutional injuries suffered by the atomic veteran is not
evident from the cases. In Everett v. United States, 492 F Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980), the
plaintiff alleged that the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Air Force vio-
lated her husband's fifth and ninth amendment rights by failing to warn him of the "harm-
ful and dangerous effects of exposure to radioactivity." 492 F Supp. at 325 n.5. The com-
plaint of the atomic veteran in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (Jaffee
III) was similarly vague. Jaffee alleged only that by compelling him to participate in the
nuclear tests, the government had violated his first, fourth, fifth, eighth, and ninth amend-
ment rights. 592 F Supp. at 714. Finally, the constitutional claims of the plaintiff in Broudy
v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) centered on what the plaintiff termed the
"unconsented-to-experimentations" conducted by the government. 661 F.2d at 127 n.4. See
generally Note, Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts, 80 MiCH. L. REv. 312
(1982); Note, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60
N.C.L. REv. 489 (1982); Note, Government Liability for Constitutional Torts: Proposals to
Amend the Federal Torts Claims Act, 49 TaNN. L. REv. 201 (1982).
116. 490 F Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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F.T.C.A. for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights occur-
ring when he voluntarily participated in a mustard gas experiment
while serving in the Navy. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the complaint, concluding
that Feres confers immunity for claims of violations of constitu-
tional rights.117
Plaintiffs suing the government directly have had no greater suc-
cess. Naming the United States as the sole defendant in Everett v.
United States,118 the surviving spouse of a soldier who partici-
pated in nuclear weapons tests brought suit under the F T.C.A.
and under the fifth and ninth amendments. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the
counts seeking constitutional relief, concluding that an action
sounding in constitutional tort, as opposed to common law tort, is
not exempt from the Feres doctrine.11 9
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
reached a similar result in Thornwell v. United States,20 a case in
which the alleged constitutional violation involved Army experi-
mentation with a hallucinogenic drug. Dismissing the plaintiff's
constitutionally based claims, the court stated that "neither the
language nor the rationale of [Feres] indicates that the legal theory
of a soldier's claim ought to be a salient factor in determining the
scope of intramilitary immunity. '' 21
The atomic veteran in Kelly v. United States122 also was unable
to recover under a constitutional tort theory for injuries caused by
his rn-service exposure to nuclear radiation. Relying on the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Jaffee I,112
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
117. 490 F Supp. at 436. Focusing on the military discipline and alternative means of
relief rationales of Feres, the district court in Schnurman added that "[c]haractenzation of
the government's conduct as intentional or unconstitutional or shocking to the conscience
does not make the statutory substitute for tort liability any less adequate or the threat to
discipline posed by suits against the military any less real." 490 F. Supp. at 437.
118. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
119. Id. at 322 (quoting Nagy v. United States, 471 F Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979)).
120. 471 F Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
121. Id. at 348.
122. 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
123. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the procedural history of the three
Jaffee cases, see supra note 91.
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sylvania in Kelly found the plaintiff's claims barred by the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. Even a direct cause of action under
the Constitution does not impose liability on the United States for
the deprivation of constitutional rights unless the government has
waived immunity from suit. 124 Consistent with Feres, the court
concluded the United States had not waived its immunity in this
context.125
Perhaps the Jaffee cases, 26 which proved controlling in Kelly,
best illustrate the use of the constitutional tort theory by an
atomic veteran against the United States and against individuals
employed by the United States. Alleging that he had developed
cancer as a result of involuntary participation in a nuclear testing
maneuver, the plaintiff in Jaffee IP17 brought a class action suit
against the United States and individual civilian and military of-
ficers.1 28 Jaffee contended that the court should create an excep-
tion to the doctrine of sovereign immunity because he alleged de-
liberate violations of constitutional rights under the first, fourth,
fifth, eighth, and ninth amendments. Citing Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 129 which recognized an implied cause of ac-
tion against federal officers who violated the fourth amendment,
and Butz v. Economou,130 which limited the immunity of. certain
federal executive "officials in Bivens-type actions, Jaffee argued
that the United States was liable under the Constitution for
wrongfully exposing him to radiation. 3
The court of appeals on interlocutory appeal rejected Jaffee's
contention and found his reliance on Bivens and Butz inappropri-
124. 512 F Supp. at 362.
125. Id.
126. 468 F Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion
of the Jaffee decisions, see supra note 91. See generally Note, Jaffee v. United States: Feres
Doctrine at the Cliff's Edge?, 42 U. Prrr. L. Rpv. 115 (1980); Note, Government Immunity
and Liability - Armed Forces-Government Officials Charged with Violating Servicemen's
Fifth Amendment Rights Not Entitled to Absolute Immunity - Jaffee v. United States, 11
SETON HALL L. RaV. 275 (1980).
127. 468 F Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979).
128. Id. at 633. For a discussion of the plaintiff's cause of action, see supra note 91.
129. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiffs proceeded under an implied right of action theory
rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because § 1983 does not apply to agents of the federal
government.
130. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
131. Jaffee I, 592 F.2d at 117-18.
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ate.1 3 2 Bivens and Butz were suits against individual federal of-
ficers; Jaffee's complaint named the United States as a defendant.
Because Jaffee had sued the government itself, "Bivens and Butz
[did] not afford him a traversable bridge across the moat of sover-
eign immunity." 133 The court of appeals thus refused to create an
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity even for deliber-
ate violations of constitutional rights.
Although the decision of the court of appeals in Jaffee I rejected
the constitutional tort theory when the plaintiff attacked the
United States directly, Jaffee's complaint primarily alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights by individuals. The United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed that part of
Jaffee's complaint in Jaffee II.13 Rejecting Jaffee's contention that
Feres does not apply to claims against individual officers for inten-
tional violations of constitutional rights, the district court dis-
missed the counts involving such claims.13 5
A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, hold-
ing that Feres accords an individual defendant only a qualified im-
munity from suit.13 6 Sitting en banc, however, the Third Circuit
vacated the panel's decision and reheard Jaffee's argument in Jaf-
fee III. 37 Distinguishing this case from Bivens,1 38 the court of ap-
peals held that Jaffee did not have a cause of action directly under
the Constitution against individual defendants for unconstitutional
torts occurring incident to service. The decision in Bivens "estab-
lished that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal
agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal
court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right."1 39
The court in Jaffee III cautioned, however, that Bivens does not
132. See supra note 91.
133. 592 F.2d at 717.
134. 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979).
135. Id. at 634. In holding the Feres ban applicable to suits against individual govern-
ment officials, the district court m Jaffee H acted consistently with the cases denying claims
against individual officers for nonconstitutional torts. See supra notes 100-12 and accompa-
nying text.
136. This opinion is unreported. See 663 F.2d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1981).
137. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
139. 663 F.2d at 1230 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
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apply in the face of an "explicit Congressional declaration" that
plaintiffs be remitted to another, equally effective remedy or if
special factors exist that suggest hesitation in the absence of af-
firmative Congressional action.140
Addressing the "special factors" limitation imposed by Bivens,
the court in Jaffee III concluded that "the deleterious effects of
service-related suits on military performance" and discipline con-
stituted strong justification not to hold individual government offi-
cials liable for damages for intentional and unconstitutional torts
in these circumstances. 141
The court also cautioned that Bivens does not apply if an alter-
native remedy exists. Conceding that Congress had not established
the Veteran's Benefits Act as a substitute for a private right of
action under the Constitution, the court nevertheless stated that
the existence of the V.B.A. "reinforces our decision to act with re-
straint. ' 142 Although the V.B.A. did not provide full compensation
to Jaffee for his losses, Jaffee was not limited to "damages [under
Bivens] or nothing. ''143
Jaffee III accurately states the law as applied by all courts in
service-related radiation exposure cases.4 When the constitutional
tort theory has been employed against the United States by ser-
vicemen, courts have refused to recognize a waiver of sovereign im-
munity Similarly, because of military discipline considerations and
compensation under the V.B.A., courts have refused to recognize
Bivens-type constitutional claims when the serviceman has sued
either the United States or individuals.
140. 663 F.2d at 1230 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-
97 (1971)).
141. 663 F.2d at 1235.
142. Id. at 1236.
143. Id.
144. Two additional radiation cases illustrate the ineffectiveness of the constitutional tort
theory. Relying primarily on Jaffee III, the district court in Fountain v. United States, 533
F Supp. 698 (W.D. Ark. 1981) rejected the constitutional claims of an atomic veteran, hold-
ing that "the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actions
alleging violations of constitutional rights." 533 F Supp. at 702. Similarly, the district court
in Lombard v. United States, 530 F Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981), without even mentioning
Jaffee III, rejected the constitutional tort theory on the basis of Feres and the long line of
non-radiation cases interpreting Feres: "[T]he courts have repeatedly read Feres to bar con-
stitutional tort claims against the government." 530 F Supp. at 920.
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Suits by Servicemen's Wives and Children
The impact of Feres extends beyond suits by military personnel:
Feres effectively insulates the United States from all claims based
on in-service injuries regardless of the party asserting the claim.145
Indeed, Feres and one of its companion cases 146 barred a wrongful
death action by the widow of a serviceman killed as a result of in-
service injuries. Thus, Feres bars claims of former military person-
nel as well as claims by their spouses or children who never were in
the military.147 The articulated justification for the total bar to
claims is that the effect upon military discipline is identical
whether the suit is brought by a soldier or by a third party.1
48
In the face of the clear bar to derivative claims by members of a
veteran's family, wives and children of atomic veterans neverthe-
less have brought suit against the United States seeking damages
for injuries arising from the veteran's in-service exposure to nu-
clear radiation. In Monaco v. United States1 49 the daughter of an
atomic veteran ' 50 filed an F.T.C.A. claim alleging that her father's
exposure to radiation caused him mutagemc injuries and conse-
quently caused her to suffer various birth defects. The daughter
argued that Feres did not preclude her claim because she could not
recover under the Veteran's Benefits Act 5' and, because she was a
civilian, her suit could not jeopardize military discipline.1 52
Citing Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,153 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
145. See generally Note, supra note 13.
146. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub noma. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
147. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 133 (9th Cir. 1981).
148. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
149. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
150. David Monaco, the father of the plaintiff m Monaco, is not a true atomic veteran m
that his exposure to nuclear radiation did not occur due to an atomic bomb detonation.
Monaco was exposed to radiation while participating in military training at the University
of Chicago between 1943 and 1946. Monaco performed calisthentics on a field directly above
the laboratories for the Manhattan Project, the program that developed the first atomic
bomb.
151. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1976). The Veteran's Benefits Act provides compensation for
any veteran who is injured or contracts disease in the line of duty during military service.
See supra note 7.
152. 661 F.2d at 133.
153. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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daughter's arguments, noting that the V.B.A. limits the govern-
ment's liability 154 To allow the daughter to recover damages in ad-
dition to her father's V.B.A. proceeds would circumvent and frus-
trate an essential V.B.A. function, which is to provide definite and
limited compensation for qualifying veterans with specific inju-
ries. 155 Addressing the military discipline issue, the court explained
that even in a suit by a serviceman's relative, "a court must still
examine the Government's activity in relation to military person-
nel on active duty." 5 e Because one of the primary purposes of the
Feres doctrine is to prevent this type of examination, Feres pre-
cluded the daughter's claims.
The children of an atomic veteran also failed to recover for their
alleged mutagenic injuries in Lombard v. United States.'57 Noting
the "distinctively federal" character of the children's claims, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia refused
to grant the children relief because their claims were "no different
from claims by the descendents of soldiers who might be exposed
to radiation on the battlefield during some future limited nuclear
war, claims surely barred by Feres."'518 The children did not re-
cover because military discipline would be affected adversely by
claims based on these indirect consequences of military orders.
Feres likewise bars derivative claims by wives of atomic veterans
seeking damages for in-service radiation injuries suffered by their
husbands. In Broudy v. United States,159 for example, the widow
of an officer irradiated while participating m military maneuvers
involving atomic weapons testing brought suit against the United
States alleging that negligent exposure and failure to warn, moni-
tor, and treat the serviceman after his discharge caused his death
from cancer. 160 The district court, relying on Feres, dismissed both
the negligent exposure and failure to warn claims. The United
154. 661 F.2d at 134 (quoting Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S.
at 673).
155. 661 F.2d at 134.
156. Id.
157. 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981).
158. Id. at 919 n.i. Plaintiff's father was exposed to radiation while participating in the
transportation and handling of materials used in the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos.
Id. at 922.
159. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
160. Id. at 126.
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal of the claim for in-service negligent exposure.161 Interpreting
United States v. Brown16 2 as standing for the proposition that
"[r]ecovery will only be allowed for a claimant whose injury was
not the result of negligence directed toward a person on active
duty, 10 3 the court found that Brown as well as Feres barred recov-
ery by the veteran's widow. 16 4
Some courts, however, do not apply Feres to derivative suits
based on m-service irradiation of veterans. In Hinkie v. United
States,165 the wife, son, and estate of a deceased son of an atomic
veteran brought an F T.C.A. suit alleging, respectively, mental
anguish causing miscarriage, severe birth defects due to chromo-
somal alterations, and pain, mental anguish, and death due to ge-
netic defects caused by radiation exposure. 6 Despite Feres, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia denied the government's motion to dismiss these claims. Con-
ceding that the plaintiff's injuries may have had their genesis inci-
dent to service,10 7 the district court refused to apply Feres to
161. Id.
162. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See generally supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
163. 661 F.2d at 127.
164. The court of appeals reversed that part of the district court's order dismissing the
wife's claim for a post-discharge failure by the government to warn, monitor, and treat her
husband. The dispositive factor with regard to this claim, however, was not the status of the
claimant, but the fact that the wife brought suit for a post-discharge tort as opposed to one
arising incident to service. The significance of this distinction is discussed infra notes 184-
223 and accompanying text.
165. 524 F Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
166. Id. at 278-79.
167. The "genesis incident to service" criteria evolved from litigation initiated in 1979
concerning the chemical defoliant, Agent Orange. In In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), Vietnam veterans sought to recover for personal injures caused by expo-
sure to the defoliant, and they named as defendants the manufacturers of Agent Orange.
Members of the veterans' families also sought to recover on various derivative claims, the
children alleging that the chencal had caused birth defects and other genetic injuries, and
the wives alleging that their husbands' exposure to the chemical had induced miscarriages.
Id. at 769.
The defendant chemical companies served third-party complaints against the United
States seeking indemnification or contribution in the event the compames were held liable
to the plaintiffs. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
applied Feres and dismissed the third-party claims against the United States. Id. at 773-80.
Focusing on the children's claims of genetic and somatic injuries, the court concluded that
the children had not suffered "direct injuries independent of [the injuries] of their parents."
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"every action somehow involving an injured serviceman. '
The court in Hinkle rejected the bare "incident to service" test
because the court considered the three factors enumerated by the
Supreme Court in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States""9 to control application of Feres.1 70 The first factor in
Stencel, the "distinctively federal" relationship between the gov-
ernment and its soldiers, carried little weight in Hinkle because
the plaintiffs' relationship to the federal government was based
solely on the veteran status of their husband or father.1 71 Because
compensation under the Veteran's Benefits Act is payable only to
any veteran disabled in line of duty, 7 2 the court in Hinkle con-
cluded that the second Stencel factor, the availability of military
benefits, similarly did not require dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims. 173 Even if the injured father could recover under the V.B.A.
for chromosomal damages, an issue the court characterized as "un-
clear, 17 4 the wife would receive nothing for her own physical inju-
ries or for her son's death.17 5 Thus, because the V.B.A. benefits
were, in a practical sense, unavailable to the plaintiffs, the second
Stencel factor carried little weight. Finally, the effect of F T.C.A.
suits on military discipline, the third Stencel factor, presented the
Id. at 780-81. Rather, any chromosomal or genetic injuries to the children had their genesis
in the exposure of their parents and thus were incident to the parent's service. Id. at 781.
Because the children, in effect, were injured by a governmental action while their parents
were in the armed force, they met the "incident to service" test of Feres, and the Feres bar
applied.
Although the court dismissed third-party indemnification claims against the United
States, the district court refused to dismiss the complaint against the defendant companies.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, conceding that the
government had an obvious interest in the welfare of the parties to the litigation, reversed
the order denying the companies' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally
Tort Remedies for Servicemen Injured by Military Equipment: A Case for Federal Com-
mon Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 601 (1980).
168. 524 F Supp. at 282.
169. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
170. 524 F Supp. at 282.
171. Id. If the Hinkies were related to a civilian government employee, their F.T.C.A.
suits would not be barred; the court found no reason to reach a different result in this case.
Id.
172. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1976).
173. 524 F Supp. at 283.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 284.
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court in Hinkie with a more difficult issue. The court conceded
that such suits would involve second-guessing of military orders.7 8
This fact, however, did not warrant dismissal of the instant suit
under Feres or Stencel, because the nuclear testing program at is-
sue had ended more than twenty years prior to the suit.177 Further-
more, the court reasoned that the injuries "were not apparent at
the time the military orders were given nor soon thereafter.",,"
Another case suggesting that the families of atomic veterans may
be able to recover under the F T.C.A. despite Feres is Laswell v.
Brown. 179 The wife and children of a deceased serviceman brought
suit against the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and other
government agencies alleging that, by exposing the serviceman to
nuclear radiation, the defendants subjected the decedent and the
plaintiffs to a high risk of disease and cellular damage. Because the
decedent was on active military duty at the time he was exposed to
radiation, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri held that Feres precluded the plaintiffs from re-
covering for any injuries personal to the decedent.8 0 The court
also dismissed the claims of the decedent's children for their ab-
normally high risk of disease and cellular damage caused by their
father's irradiation. The claims were dismissed, however, not be-
cause the alleged genetic injuries had their genesis incident to ser-
vice, but because the children alleged merely "the possibility of
some future harm."'' The court indicated that the children could
bring an F.T.C.A. suit for injuries actually sustained; however,
merely alleging a high risk of disease and cellular damage did not
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thus, the claims
of an atomic veteran's children in Laswell failed because of inade-
quate proof of actual harm to the children, not because of Feres.28 2
Despite the Laswell decision and the dicta in Hinkie suggesting
that suits by wives and children of atomic veterans do not impli-




179. 524 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
180. Id. at 849.
181. Id. at 850.
182. Id.
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doctrine, the vast majority of military tort cases indicate that de-
rivative claims disrupt military discipline, subvert the Veteran's
Benefits Act, and interfere with the "distinctively federal" rela-
tionship between the government and its soldiers. Monaco v.
United States""3 illustrates that courts recognize the ban on deriv-
ative suits even within the context of atomic veteran cases. Indeed,
Hinkie and Laswell are unique in holding that Feres does not bar
derivative claims by family members for injuries having their basis
in an in-service tort. An atomic veteran or a member of his family
can expect more success by alleging a separate post-discharge tort
than by arguing that Feres simply does not apply.
A SEPARATE POST-DISCHARGE TORT: THE FAILURE TO WARN
Because the Feres doctrine presents an almost insurmountable
obstacle to an F.T.C.A. recovery, an atomic veteran or members of
his family injured by in-service exposure to radiation should aban-
don claims for rn-service injuries and allege instead a separate
post-discharge injury. By establishing a tort not occurring incident
to service, an atomic veteran can avoid, rather than attempt to cir-
cumvent, the Feres doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1954 case of United
States v. Brown,15 4 allowed a former serviceman to recover under
the F T.C.A. for the negligence of Veterans' Administration physi-
cians in performing surgery In explaining the nonapplicability of
the Feres doctrine, the Court found that because the surgery oc-
curred after the serviceman's discharge, the alleged negligence was
not incident to service and Feres did not bar the suit.185 Thus,
Brown illustrates that the "incident to service" test does not en-
compass separate injuries inflicted by the government after a sol-
dier's discharge. Recent cases cite Brown for the proposition that
recovery for post-discharge injuries is not only consistent with
Feres, but is compelled by Brown.186
Most servicemen claiming post-discharge torts have been suc-
183. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
184. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
185. 348 U.S. at 112.
186. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F Supp. 344, 349 (D.D.C. 1979).
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cessful. In Schwartz v. United States,18 7 a discharged serviceman
recovered under the F.T.C.A. for government doctors' negligent
failure to determine the nature of a substance in the plaintiff's si-
nuses. The substance, a radioactive dye, had been administered to
the plaintiff while he was in the service.188 Although the govern-
ment doctor knew of the dangerous characteristics of the substance
prior to administering it, Feres and the "incident to service" test
precluded recovery for the initial use of the drug.18 9 Plaintiff then
based his claim on the government's failure to review the records
of all former servicemen to whom the drug had been administered
and to alert their physicians. 90 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that the dispos-
itive factor in Schwartz was that government doctors committed a
separate tort after the plaintiff had been discharged. 91
Servicemen whose intentional and constitutional tort theories
failed also have been successful employing the post-discharge tort
theory. In Thornwell v. United States,192 the plaintiff had been an
unwitting participant while in the service in an experiment testing
the effectiveness of L.S.D. as an aid to interrogation. Only after his
discharge did he learn of his exposure to the drug. As in Schwartz,
Feres barred the plaintiff in Thornwell from recovering for the ini-
tial in-service administration of the drug.19 3 The government's fail-
ure to provide Thornwell with any follow-up examination, how-
ever, supported an F.T.C.A. claim because the failure occurred
after Thornwell's discharge.' 9
By pleading a separate post-discharge tort, the servicemen in
Brown, Schwartz, Thornwell, and similar cases' 95 avoided the "in-
187. 230 F Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
188. Id. at 537.
189. Id. at 539-40.
190. "The negligence here is m not having affirmatively sought out those who had been
endangered [by the drug] after there was knowledge of the danger." Id. at 540.
191. Id.
192. 471 F Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
193. Id. at 347-48.
194. Id. at 349.
195. See, e.g., Hungerford v. United States, 192 F Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1952) (recovery allowed for post-discharge aggravation
of injuries due to failure to diagnose brain injury while plaintiff was in service); Nagy v.
United States, 471 F Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979) (victim of Army L.S.D. experiments could
have recovered for post-discharge injuries but for the fact that plaintiff voluntarily took
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cident to service" hurdle of Feres and recovered under the
F T.C.A. The post-discharge tort theory, however, is not univer-
sally accepted. Several courts characterize the post-discharge tort
as a continuation of the in-service occurrence. Under this continu-
ing tort theory, "a mere act of negligence which takes place while
the plaintiff is on duty and which then remains uncorrected after
discharge is not grounds for suit." '
The court in Thornwell attempted to explain the tension be-
tween the post-discharge tort and the continuing tort theories by
recognizing three types of post-discharge tort cases. In the first
type of case, the government performs two separate negligent acts
- one before discharge and one after discharge. In this situation,
governmental liability extends only to the second act.19 7 In the sec-
ond type of case, the effect of the government's in-service act "lin-
gers" after discharge. This situation is factually similar to Feres
and therefore is barred.19 8 The third type of case involves an inten-
tional tort by the government while the plaintiff is on military
duty, followed by a negligent failure to protect the soldier from the
consequences of the tort after he is discharged. The government's
failure to protect the ex-serviceman m this case is actionable. 19
Only m the first and third cases, in which the government commits
a separate and distinct tortious act after a serviceman's discharge,
may a serviceman recover.
Wary of the "possibility that artful pleading may be employed to
elevate one continuing act of negligence into separate wrongs, ''200
courts carefully scrutinize evidence supporting a separate post-dis-
charge tort. In Schnurman v. United States,01 for example, a vet-
eran brought an F.T.C.A. suit for in-service exposure to mustard
gas during a 1949 Navy experiment. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiff's
claims, partially because the evidence presented at trial did not
drug 50 to 100 times after discharge).
196. See, e.g., Hennmg v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404
U.S. 1016 (1972).
197. 471 F Supp. at 350.
198. Id. at 352.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 490 F Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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substantiate the claims of a post-discharge failure to warn.20 2
Plaintiff presented no testimony that post-discharge negligence by
the government aggravated or multiplied his injuries, nor did he
show that follow-up treatment could have prevented any long-term
effects of exposure to the mustard gas.2 03 Schnurman illustrates
that successful use of the post-discharge tort theory requires both
an allegation of an after-service injury and convincing evidence
that the injury was separate and distinct from an underlying in-
service tort.
Atomic veterans advancing the post-discharge tort theory gener-
ally plead that the government failed to warn the servicemen of
the hazardous effects of radiation. The failure to warn theory has
been employed successfully by the victims of in-service nuclear
testing, although the exact source of a duty to warn, monitor, and
treat an injury has not been articulated by the courts.20' In Everett
202. Id. at 436-37. The applicable statute of limitations also barred the claim.
203. Id. at 437.
204. In Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979), the plaintiff sought
damages from the United States for injuries he sustained as a result of his participation in
an Army L.S.D. experiment. The plaintiff alleged both pre-discharge and post-discharge
torts, including the government's failure "to exercise their duty of care by neglecting to
rescue him from the position of danger wuch [the government] had created." 471 F. Supp.
at 351. Addressing the ill-defined parameters of this alleged duty, the district court noted
that "it is not clear whether [the plaintiff] is relying on a general duty of care or a duty
arising out of official regulations or public promises." Id. at 357 n.7.
The "general duty of care" referred to in Thornwell is the most viable source of a govern-
mental duty to warn veterans who participated in nuclear tests of the possible effects of
radiation exposure. An accepted principle of tort law holds that "if [an] actor does an act,
and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
risk from taking effect." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 321 (1966).
Based on the general tort theory, the United States government could be held to a duty to
warn atomic veterans of the consequences of their irradiation. One case indicating that the
government is held to this standard is Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698 (D. Ark.
1981). Addressing the fhilure to warn theory, the court in Fountain explained that "[t]he
law never imposes a duty to warn, instruct, or disclose unless there is some other nexus
between the parties." 533 F Supp. at 702. The court conceded that the government, having
subjected the plaintiff to a danger, "arguably became under a duty to take remedial steps to
minimize [the plaintiffs] risk." Id. The court found, however, that any harm to the plaintiff
caused by the government's failure to warn "arose directly and actually from his exposure to
radioactive fallout" while in the service. Id. Because the failure to warn was a continuation
of the m-service injury covered by the Feres doctrine, the failure to warn claims likewise
were barred by Feres.
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v. United States,0 5 the atomic veteran alleged that the United
States, "acting by and through its servants and employees con-
ceal[ed], minimiz[ed] and fail[ed] to warn of or disclose
knowledge of the causal relation between [the ser-
viceman's] exposure to radioactivity and subsequent con-
tracting . of cancer. ' 206 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the veteran's F T.C.A.
claim based on intentional and constitutional torts, but refused to
dismiss the F T.C.A. claim for post-discharge failure to warn.20 7
The court concluded that the government's failure to warn was not
a mere continuation of an in-service act, because the initial expo-
sure to radiation was willful while the subsequent failure to warn
was negligent. The government's post-service negligence amounted
to a "distinctly separate pattern of conduct," and thus was action-
able despite Feres.2 °8
The failure to warn theory received less favorable treatment in
Broudy v. United States.0 9 In Broudy, the wife of a deceased
atomic veteran brought an F T.C.A. suit for both the in-service ir-
radiation of her husband and the government's subsequent failure
to warn, monitor, and treat her husband after his discharge. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed dis-
missal of the in-service exposure claim because of "the clear appli-
cability of the Feres doctrine. 2 10 Addressing the failure to warn
claim, the court acknowledged that a claim is cognizable under the
F T.C.A. if the plaintiff can allege and prove an independent, post-
discharge, tortious act by the government. 211 Because the appel-
lant's allegations did not indicate clearly any post-discharge negli-
gence, the appellate court vacated the district court's dismissal and
remanded the case to allow appellant to develop her failure to
warn claim. In remanding the case, the court indicated that the
government's alleged failure to warn might constitute an indepen-
dent tort only if the government learned of the danger after
205. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
206. Id. at 325 n.5.
207. Id. at 325.
208. Id. at 326.
209. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
210. Id. at 127.
211. Id. at 128.
[Vol. 24:259
ATOMIC VETERANS' TORT CLAIMS
Broudy left the service.2 12
By suggesting that a post-discharge failure to warn is actionable
only if the government acquired knowledge of the danger of nu-
clear radiation after the serviceman's discharge, the court in
Broudy appears to characterize such failure as a continuing tort for
which recovery is precluded if the duty to warn arose during the
victim's military service. In other words, Broudy indicates that if
the government had a duty to warn a serviceman prior to his dis-
charge, the failure to warn occurs but once;21 3 because the initial
failure to warn occurs incident to service, Feres prevents an
F T.C.A. recovery for the government's breach of its duty to warn.
Other courts addressing failure to warn claims in the context of
suits by atomic veterans have agreed with the court of appeals de-
cision in Broudy.214 In Kelly v. Unted States, 215 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed
an atomic veteran's failure to warn claim, finding that the distmc-
tion between pre-discharge and post-discharge failure to warn was
artificial.21 Unpersuaded that the plaintiff's complaint alleged
post-discharge conduct factually distinct from the alleged tortious
conduct occurring while the plaintiff was still in the service, the
court in Kelly found no essential difference between the govern-
ment's initial failure to warn and its failure to warn the plaintiff
thereafter.217 The court concluded that plaintiff's claim of a post-
discharge tort was "in reality but a skillful reformulation of a com-
212. Id.
213. Id. at 128-29.
214. In Hennmg v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 778 (3d Cir. 1971), the plaintiff alleged
that government doctors failed to warn him, both before and after his discharge, of his
tubercular condition. The court rejected plaintiff's claim based on a post-discharge failure to
warn, stating that any resulting injuries were merely continuations of the previous tort. Sim-
ilarly, the atomic veteran in Lombard v. United States, 530 F Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981)
failed to recover under the post-discharge tort theory. By exposing Lombard to nuclear radi-
ation and subsequently failing to warn him of the dangers of such exposure, the government
committed only one continuing act of negligence. Id. at 920. The continuing tort theory
produced the same result in Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Ark. 1981).
Focusing on the "nexus between the act of exposing [the plaintiff] to radioactive
fallout and the government's failure to take subsequent remedial measures," the court in
Fountain held that Feres barred "the tortious acts and omissions of the government occur-
ring after [the plaintiff's] discharge." 533 F. Supp. at 702.
215. 512 F Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
216. Id. at 361-62.
217. Id. at 360.
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plaint for in-service negligence"2 8 and barred by Feres.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri in Laswell v. Brown219 also characterized an alleged post-
discharge failure to warn as a mere continuation of an in-service
tort. The plaintiffs in Laswell, the widow and children of an
atomic veteran, in part based their F T.C.A. action on the govern-
ment's intentional and negligent failure to warn the veteran and
his offspring of the high risk of disease and cellular damage associ-
ated with radiation exposure. The complaint also included an alle-
gation that the government failed to provide follow-up medical
treatment.220 Acknowledging the split of authority between courts
accepting the post-discharge failure to warn as a separate tort and
those courts refusing to characterize such failure as a distinct
act,221 the court in Laswell followed the latter approach. Acknowl-
edging the breadth of Feres, the court reasoned that the doctrine
would be restricted severely if a serviceman was prevented from
recovering for his in-service irradiation while his survivors recov-
ered for failure to monitor and treat injuries resulting from the
same tort.222
Although post-discharge torts clearly are actionable under
Unted States v. Brown,223 most courts addressing post-discharge
failure to warn claims do not concede the presence of two separate
torts. Additionally, because no clear criteria exists for establishing
the "separateness" of post-discharge failure to warn, an atomic
veteran advancing a failure to warn claim cannot know what he is
expected to prove. Consequently, the failure to warn theory, like
the alternative theories previously discussed, provides little hope
for the atomic veteran.
218. Id. at 361.
219. 524 F Supp. 847 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
220. Id. at 848.
221. Id. at 849-50. Compare Everett v. United States, 492 F Supp. 318 (S.D. Olo 1980)
and Thornwell v. United States, 471 F Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (accepting the post-dis-
charge failure to warn theory) with Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981)
and Kelly v. United States, 512 F Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to characterize fail-
ure to warn as a separate post-discharge tort).
222. 524 F Supp. at 850.
223. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Feres doctrine may be an unwarranted judicially created ex-
ception to the F T.C.A.'s broad waiver of sovereign imnunity; nev-
ertheless, the doctrine remains an obstacle to suits under the Act
by servicemen for in-service injuries. Since announcement of the
doctrine more than thirty years ago, neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has initiated significant change despite extensive crit-
icism of the doctrine. Because of Feres, military personnel alleging
injuries caused by in-service exposure to nuclear radiation have
been unsuccessful in recovering under the F T.C.A. or directly
under the Constitution. If these veterans and their families are to
be compensated, "it is for Congress, not the courts, to fashion the
remedy. The Court will not carve out an exception to sovereign
immunity in a situation where the rationale underlying Feres does
not clearly mandate such an extraordinary step. '224 Unless Con-
gress acts, atomic veterans can expect little success in attempts to
recover for injuries due to in-service exposure to nuclear radiation.
J. THOMAS MORINA
224. Lombard v. United States, 530 F Supp. 918, 922 (D.D.C. 1981) (suit by atomic
veteran).
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